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South Eastern Europe at the beginning 
of the 21st century 
New dangers, new strategies, new perspectives 
The war in Kosovo marked the end of a turbulent century for the whole of South East-
ern Europe. A century of perils, bloodsheds and suffering. The beginning of the new 
century was connected with the hope for peace at last, for a stable and prosperous region 
able to be integrated into the United Europe. But this kind of a peace has not come yet. 
The real peace, expected and even dreamed for in the region should be a new peace or-
der, that will make future wars on the Balkans impossible, a peace order that will bring 
at last stability and prosperity in this impoverished and turbulent part of Europe. Such a 
peace is not achieved yet with the stationing of the KFOR and the establishing of the 
UNMIK administration in Kosovo, is even endangered with the new outbursts of fight-
ing in South Serbia and Macedonia, but nevertheless for the first time in the long and 
tragic Balkan history is closer than ever. The dawn of a new future for the Balkans 
opening a bright perspective for all Balkan post-communist societies is glimmering a l-
ready over the horizon. The intent of the international community, of the NATO and the 
EU to introduce the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe with its ultimate goal  - the 
integration of the region into the EU structures are a strong guarantee, that this future 
will come into existence. However, this future is still a distant one. There is a long way 
until it could be reached a nd the politicians together with the experts should warn from 
overoptimistic expectations. Very often such expectations give way to bitter disap-
pointments and such developments should be avoided in the region.  
Because the legacy and the forces of the past, the inertia of the past are still very strong. 
Because the tasks for stabilising and transforming the Balkans are without a parallel in 
the region’s history. The challenge is of such a proportion that the international com-
munity and Balkan societies should be prepared for  long and difficult efforts and u n-
easy victories until the goal appears within reach.  
Winning in Kosovo was just winning the first battle in the long war for the European 
future of the Balkans. Stopping after the first win and not trying to develop it further we 
start to face the danger of restoring the pre-war situation dominated by ethnic hatred and Emil Mintchev 
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ethnic cleansing, but with a role swap  - the victims and the oppressors just change 
places. If the international community allows this to  happen and to prevail, then all the 
efforts and all the suffering would be in vain. To go further means that we should try to 
break the vicious circle of ethnic animosity, means much more efforts, much more eco-
nomic and financial burdens and may-be less spectacular victories. The already starting 
to appear "Balkan fatigue" may divert the attention of the world public opinion or make 
some projects politically unpopular. Some regional setbacks could have a negative i m-
pact on the Western readiness to pursue this costly strategy. One of the ways to counter 
this "Balkan fatigue" is to explore the possibility for such setbacks, to identify the prob-
able traps and to suggest alternative solutions for the most acute regional problems, if a 
traditional approach could not bring the expected results. 
1. Was the war in Kosovo inevitable? 
The war in Kosovo came to the Balkans as a kind of a natural catastrophe. Everybody 
expected that it is going to happen, but very little was undertaken to prevent it. A kind 
of fatalistic mood, at least in the region, prevailed and the war started to be considered 
as something inevitable. This fatalism was a result of the "cold war" between the Serbs 
and the Kosovo Albanians already going on since 1989, but also of the reluctance of the 
international community to address seriously the conflict and the obvious failure of the 
preventive diplomacy since the Dayton peace accord. A lot of international experts and 
politicians hoped that in the end some miracle is going to happen and Milosevic could 
be won for a kind of a peace accord, forgetting or may be wishing to forget that the pol-
icy of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo was already under way. But the e xpulsion of whole 
ethnic groups is usually the final phase of such a policy, which started in the  case of 
Kosovo with the elimination of the autonomy status of the province in 1989. This policy 
had passed the "point of no return" in the months after the Dayton peace accord and had 
inflicted so much irreparable damage on the interethnic relations in Kosovo that any 
international pressure, no matter how strong it could be, was in a position to change a 
lot.
1 
That is why the expectations that the Rambouillet I and the Rambouillet II peace talks 
are going to produce a kind of a temporary settlement that will stop the fighting in Kos-
ovo and probably offer a sort of a local autonomy for the Kosovo Albanians, were far-
fetched. Because they would not be able to eliminate the main reason for the Kosovo 
conflict - the reluctance of both ethnic groups - the Serbs and the Kosovo Albanians to 
 
1  See Stefan Troebst: Conflict in Kosovo: Causes and Cures. In: Hans-Georg Ehrhart, 
Albrecht Schnabel (eds.): The Southeast European Challenge: Ethnic Conflict and 
the International Response. Baden-Baden 1999, pp. 85-116. South Eastern Europe 
  5 
live together in a common state, consider this state their own and pursuing together a 
common future for it. 
The animosity and the division lines between Serbs and Albanians became so deep that 
they make almost impossible any inner conviction that peace and cooperation are better 
than war and partition. But to negotiate a peace accord without the inner conviction of 
its necessity would for sure undermine its future and so the fate of a eventual peace ac-
cord in Rambouillet was easily to be predicted. Although every peace, even a bad one is 
preferable than a war of any kind, a peace accord with a lot of shortcomings and an un-
certain future would for sure fail to achieve its main objective - to make the peace irre-
versible and lead to t he final reconciliation of the warring parties. In 1995 in Dayton 
such a peace accord was produced after an extreme international pressure only for the 
International peace council for Bosnia to conclude three years later at its conference in 
Madrid in December 1998, that the peace process is stumbling due to the lack of self 
responsibility by the conflicting parties.
2 
For sure the presence of the SFOR-troops would continue to prevent any possible out-
burst of armed hostility, but what we witness is some kind of a truce-like, than peace-
like atmosphere. In Rambouillet a kind of a repetition of the Dayton accord for Kosovo 
could be produced, most probably with the same shortcomings and dangers.
3 
Such an accord could lure the international community into the wishful thinking that 
through a sophisticated "stick and carrot" diplomacy peace could be achieved at any 
time and in any conflict on the Balkans. The war in Kosovo showed the futility of such 
thinking. Then by dealing with the enormous conflict potential in  the Balkans apiece, 
concentrating on a conflict after it erupts with violence and bloodshed, the international 
community is like a fire-brigade extinguishing fires, but overlooking the need for their 
prevention. Conflict prevention is by any means preferable to a conflict resolution and a 
regional approach would be much promising than the attempt to bring under control a 
separate conflict usually when it is too late. 
2. Understanding the Balkans 
Such a regional approach already has its historic precedents.  After the Russian-Turkish 
war in 1877-78 the Great Powers met in Berlin in August 1878 to review the Balkan 
situation after the San-Stefano peace treaty and rearrange the political map of the r e-
gion. The Berlin Congress dealt with all hot issues in the peninsula and the redrawn 
 
2  International Herald Tribune, 15.12.1998. 
3  See also Marc Weller: The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo, in: International 
Affairs, 2/1999, pp. 163-203. Emil Mintchev 
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borders, although highly controversial and the offered guarantees, secured nevertheless 
the peace in the region for more than three decades.
4 
The Berlin Congress participants were almost the same as the present day Balkan Con-
tact Group members, but they concentrated not on a single issue, be it Bosnia or Kos-
ovo, preferring to address the whole region. The situation after the collapse of commu-
nism and the dissolution of ex-Yugoslavia made such an approach even more imminent 
and it was  hardly understandable why the international community was r eluctant to 
abandon the manner of dealing separately with the conflicts in the region one by one. 
The war in Kosovo has forced the international community to change the approach. The 
readiness to c hange the approach is to be accompanied by a change of the attitude to-
ward the region. To pacify the Balkans follows the pattern to understand the Balkans 
and may-be this is the point where the international community has some shortcomings. 
What we are dealing with  - with an extremely high density of local problems due to the 
backwardness of the local people in their rural societies with deep roots in the past, or 
with one complex problem with many facets transgressing borders, inherited and in the 
same time born anew by the profound changes after 1989. To get the real answer means 
that we have to get rid of a lot of clichés and myths about the Balkans, of patterns nur-
tured with care by many regional, but also extra-regional politicians. These clichés and 
specific Balkan mythology rely on certain historic facts, a fact that makes them almost 
resistant to every critic. The facts include the belonging of the Balkan peoples to differ-
ent cultures, the existence of a division line between the Western catholic and the East-
ern orthodox churches and later between Christianity and Islam that also passes through 
the region, the centuries of old ethnic and confessional animosities.
5 
All these facts are irrefutable, but instead of explaining, they very often simplify or even 
distort the real reasons for the present day Balkan crisis. Than if we put history aside, 
we witness now a process of nations and nation states building on the territory of ex-
Yugoslavia and the attempts by local politicians to use this process for their own pur-
poses. The tools are different - to push it forward or to reverse it, but the aims - to gain 
or to stay in power are almost the same. Actually the process of nations and nation 
states building started on the Balkans much more later than in Western Europe and was 
stopped unfinished after the World War I with the emergence of the Versailles peace 
system. This stop was reinforced with the Yalta accords and only the end of the Yalta 
post-war peace order brought the process again into life. The result was the dissolution 
 
4  See about the Balkan history with accent on Kosovo the recent publications by 
Noel Malcolm, Kosovo: A Short History. London, New York , N.Y. 1998 and 
Miranda Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo. London, New 
York, NY, 1998. 
5  See also William Hagen: The Balkans’ Lethal Nationalisms, in: Foreign Affairs, 
July/August 1999, pp. 52-65. South Eastern Europe 
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of ex-Yugoslavia and the establishment of five independent states on its former terri-
tory. The reluctance of the Serbian leadership to accept the new realities and the attempt 
to reverse the process initiated the violence which culminated with the war in Bosnia. 
The developments in the now Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which is a multiethnic 
state may indicate, that the process of nations and nation states building is far from over. 
This process will end when the separate ethnicities see their objectives reached, either as 
an independent state, or as a federation or confederation in which  they can live together 
with the certain level of autonomy and cooperate for the sake of their common future. 
Up to the overthrough of President Milosevic the FRY has failed to guarantee the rights 
of its citizens of different ethnic origin, a fact which made it hardly a preferable home 
for all ethnic groups living on its territory. This situation endangers the territorial integ-
rity of FRY, whose leadership could not for ever insist, that the attitude toward the non-
Serbs is an internal matter of a sovereign state. Besides the Kosovo Albanians, the Hun-
garians in Voivodina, which autonomy status was also eliminated by Milosevic, the 
Muslims in Sandjak and even the majority of the Montenegrins, whose country enjoys 
the status of a republic in the FRY, were by far not fascinated with the realities in pre-
sent day FRY, which under Milosevic was a federal republic only on paper and r e-
mained in fact a smaller version of a Great Serbia.
6 
All these ethnic groups to a great extent prefer a separate future for themselves and 
some of them may be persistent enough in their efforts to achieve it, a possibility which 
the government in Belgrade has to counter not by force, but by a reasonable, integrative 
policy based on European standards towards the non-Serbs. In the same time the inter-
national community should not dismiss such a possibility as something heretic, encour-
aging so indirectly the hard line in the Serbian policy. 
Another often misinterpreted aspect of the Balkan crisis is the fact that its stems to a 
great extent from the isolation of the region from the mainstream of the European civili-
sation. First the centuries long Ottoman rule and then, after a short period of the nations 
and nation states building, the establishing of communist regimes almost all over the 
Balkans transferred the region into an almost forgotten European periphery, whose pre-
dominance of parochial archaic society structures made it a perfect home for some of 
the most brutal communist dictators. 
The absence of a European perspective for the development of the region for long peri-
ods of time was an additional factor, that increased the negative impact of the social, 
cultural and industrial backwardness of the Balkan peoples. And they were already r i-
vals in the run for the partition of the legacy of the Ottoman empire. 
This rivalry took new dimensions when the European Great Powers ceased to be part-
ners for the search of a common policy towards t he Balkans and began to look for 
 
6  See also Robert Thomas: The Politics of Serbia in the 1990s, New York 1999. Emil Mintchev 
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spheres of influence and for client states in the region. so the period of a relative stabil-
ity since the Berlin congress in 1878 ended abruptly with the series of Balkan crises in 
the beginning of the 20th Century, that led to two Balkan wars and to the start of World 
War I. The region remained an area for Great powers’ competition for spheres of influ-
ence also in the years between the World Wars. The division of Europe after Yalta once 
more deprived the majority of the Balkan peoples from a certain European perspective. 
The end of the Cold war and the collapse of communism meant for the Balkan peoples 
not only a new chance for a nation’s revival, but also for a new and more promising 
European perspective. The establishing o f the new nation states in the region was not 
only the realisation of the century’s old ideal, but also the hope for a quicker integration 
into the European family of democratic nations. Unfortunately the enormous conflict 
potential in the region delays this integration, but the fervent wish of the local societies 
for a clear European perspective could be used for the gradual elimination of this con-
flict potential.
7 
Some lessons from the past may be useful in the present day situation. The first is the 
interdependence between the isolation from the mainstream of the European develop-
ment and the conflict potential in the region. The second is the interdependence between 
the rivalry for spheres of influence and for client states in the region on part of the Great 
powers and its conflict potential. The necessary conclusions seem to be, that if the trend 
towards isolation is reversed and the Great powers, i. e. the international community act 
in concert, the conflict potential may start to diminish. These considerations are not 
new, but quite a little has been done to implement them into the policy of the interna-
tional community towards the Balkans. One of the reasons probably was, that such a 
policy until recently was non existent. The first attempts to elaborate such a policy were 
made within the framework of the Balkan contact group, but even here priority was 
given to the conflict zones and not to the region as a whole. The Kosovo crisis triggered 
a conceptual change on this subject and a long term strategy for the region starts to be 
considered more vital for the future peace order on the Balkans, than the often futile 
attempts to pacify conflicting parties already at war.
8 
The idea to start a "partnership for prosperity"-programme advocated by the then NATO 
General Secretary Solana was a very promising sign in this direction, but the war in 
Kosovo came ahead of any practical realisation of this idea. The "Stability Pact for 
South Eastern Europe" proposal appeared amidst the air strikes against FRY and 
brought n ew dimensions to this approach. The G -8 joint action that led to the UN Secu-
 
7  See Ehrhart/Schnabel (eds.) op. cit. 
8  See Timothy Garton Ash: Kosovo and Beyond, in: The New York Times Review of 
Books, 24.6.1999, pp 4-7. South Eastern Europe 
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rity Council resolution 1244 showed how vital the combined efforts and the involve-
ment of Russia for any peace solution could be.
9 
But even on this stage one important lesson from  the past should not be forgotten - only 
acting in concert the international community could succeed in its efforts to impose 
peace on the conflicting parties. Every division line, be it in the G -8, or the Balkan con-
tact group, be it among the permanent members of the UN Security Council will for 
sure undermine the peace efforts and delay the implementation of the new conceptual 
approach. The Kosovo crisis helped the international community to reach the conclu-
sion that this new conceptual approach has to lead to the emergence of a new integrative 
strategy for the Balkans, that should provide a clear European perspective for the r e-
gion, a perspective so long denied by history, that it became almost an unfulfilled dream 
for the local population.
10 
3. Aftermath of the war 
The war activities were limited to the territory of FRY, but their implications were felt 
throughout the whole region. The plight of the refugees, who almost paralysed the 
neighbouring Macedonia and Albania and created problems on a lesser scale for Monte-
negro and BiH, indicated to the world community in a very drastical way, that no coun-
try in the region could be safe or immune from the policy of extreme nationalism of Mr. 
Milosevic. Actually one of the aims of his policy was the further destabilisation of the 
whole region through the Kosovo conflict, the export of instability and deterioration 
with the forceful expulsion of almost 1 million Kosovo Albanians and the eventual col-
lapse of the neighbouring Albania and Macedonia under the burden of the hundred 
thousands displaced Kosovars. Belgrade nearly succeeded with this policy, which was 
blocked thanks to the immense international efforts only and the victory of the "Allied 
force" operation. The other front line states, Croatia, Hungary, Romania a nd Bulgaria, 
had to swallow some quite heavy economic losses, a fact confirming the conclusion, 
that the whole region was a hostage of the insane policy of Mr. Milosevic.
11 
That is why, with a few exceptions, Belgrade was isolated during this war and countries 
like Bulgaria and Romania demonstrated even greater Atlantic solidarity, by offering 
their air space and logistic support for the "Allied force" operation, than some NATO-
 
9  About the Russian interests on the Balkans, see Alexander Rah: Rußlands Interes-
sen auf dem Balkan, in: Europäische Sicherheit , 7/1999. 
10  About the response of the international community, see Strobe Talbot: The Balkan 
Question and the European Answer, Address at the Aspen Institute, 
24.8.1999/http://www. state.gov/www/policy. 
11  For the costs of the war, see the different publications of WIIW Current Analyses 
and Country Profiles by Vladimir Gligorov and Niclas Sundström, Wien. Emil Mintchev 
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members. Despite the economic losses countries like Bulgaria and Romania displayed a 
lot of mature and disciplined behaviour, what as they hope, could be helpful for their 
drive toward a NATO- and EU-membership. On the other hand, Albania and Macedonia 
demonstrated that for their stability they need a strong international support, combined 
with an international (NATO) military presence. 
Albania, whose state administration and state control collapsed in 1997, remains highly 
vulnerable and is hardly in a position to cope alone with the situation in the aftermath of 
the Kosovo war. The influx of refugees from Kosovo, who belong to the so-called Geg 
community and the establishment of Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK) semilegal or 
clandestine structures in the Albanian North, where Gegs are living traditionally , could 
not but straighten the Geg s ide in the very delicate balance with the Tosks, who live in 
the Albanian South. The differences between the two parts of the Albanian people are 
not only ethnographic and linguistic, but have developed also a political context. The 
Albanian South, i. e. t he majority of the Tosks, is the stronghold of the Socialist party, 
which is the governing party after the showdown in 1997-98 with the Democratic Party 
of Mr. Berisha, the former Albanian president, whose stronghold are the Geg regions. In 
a backward society, where belonging to a clan is much more important than belonging 
to a political party, the toppling of the Berisha government and the victory of the Social-
ists, was quite broadly understood as a Tosks’ victory over the Gegs. The tension be-
tween them has never receded as the violent demonstrations in the fall of 1998 indi-
cated. For Mr. Berisha and his clans the establishment of the UCK structures is a major 
boost, and he will probably attempt to use it for the sake of his own political ambitions. 
The transformation of the UCK into a Kosovo Defence Corps in Kosovo would increase 
the importance of these structures as military bases and weapon depots, if one day the 
demonstration of a military strength becomes a necessity. That is why a western mili-
tary presence in Albania is so vital not only for internal political reasons, but also as a 
break against overambitious plans concerning Kosovo. 
In Macedonia an analogical situation is observed in the Western part of the country, 
inhabited predominantly with Albanians from the Geg community. Despite the fact, that 
one local Albanian political party takes part in the coalition government in Skopje, the 
tensions between the Macedonian Slav majority and the Albanians have reached their 
peak during the influx of the Kosovo refugees, when the police tried several times to 
close the border, or to transfer the refugees to Albania without their consent. The anti-
Albanian feelings could be sensed in the huge anti-war and anti-NATO demonstrations 
in Skopie, in which by far not only representatives of the Serb minority in Macedonia 
took part. The situation was also instrumentalised for internal political reasons in the 
policy of the parliamentary opposition, where the pro-Serb sentiments could be easily 
detected. All these developments mean, that if in Kosovo the UCK was forced to u n-
dergo a transformation, in Albania and in Western Macedonia the already existing clan-South Eastern Europe 
 11
destine UCK structures continued to operate secretly, creating so potential and real dan-
gers for the legitimate state authority in both countries. This was actually the case with 
the recent activities of the UCK rebels around the Macedonian city of Tetovo. In Alba-
nia such developments would lead to the appearance of another power-oriented factor 
among the others already existing. But in Macedonia it endangers the very existence of 
the young nation state and may provoke new interethnic tensions escalating into a new 
Balkan war. 
The international community has to counter such dangerous developments by securing a 
Western m ilitary  presence both in Albania and in Macedonia for a certain period of 
time. This means, that the zone of the international military presence should encompass 
not only Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina, but also Albania and Macedonia. It would be 
up to the experts in international law to decide, how they will call the different types of 
international military presence on the Balkan-protectorate proper like Kosovo, protec-
torate in fact, but not in name like BiH, or just stability enforcing military presence like 
in Albania and Macedonia. The reality will be, that the Western part of the Balkans, 
where the conflict potential is at its highest, is to remain under close international sur-
veillance for a substantial period of time. This surveillance (and control)  would take 
different forms, but it should be there in order to transform the most turbulent part of the 
region into a real or quasi protectorate with a different level of military and administra-
tive control by the international community. It seems, that such an approach could be 
the only way to enforce peace and stability in the Western Balkans. The military pres-
ence there should have to be flanked by a strong political and economic presence of the 
Western democracies in the rest of the region. This presence, together with a real drive 
towards a strong regional cooperation, may facilitate the creation of the so-called "soft 
security" environment, which is vital also for the success of the grand strategy for trans-
formation of the Balkans. 
But what is this grand strategy going to be? The international community already has 
the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe at its disposal. The pact is designed as the 
tool for bringing peace and stability in the region, securing the post-war reconstruction, 
that would  lead to economic prosperity, promoting democracy, creating so the best 
guarantees for turning the local post-communist societies into true civil societies, able to 
be integrated into the European and Euroatlantic structures.
12 
The Stability Pact is the boldest attempt so far for breaking the vicious circle of ethnic 
violence on the Balkans and removing the biggest obstacle for its integration into 
United Europe  - the retarded development of the region and its backwardness stemming 
from the centuries of old i solation from the mainstream of the European civilisation. 
 
12  The text of the Stability Pact for South-eastern Europe in http://www.  Auswaerti-
ges-amt. De/stabpact. Htm Emil Mintchev 
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Because the only goal that could unite all ethnic and religious communities on the Bal-
kans and possibly could make them to forget all divisions, all past and present animosi-
ties is undoubtedly the  integration into United Europe. The full membership in the EU 
and for those who wish it  - also in NATO remains the only future, that is a common 
future for all in the region, that could generate joint efforts and convert former and pre-
sent foes into future partners.
13 
Just stability or prosperity could not become ultimate goals for the Balkans. Both stabil-
ity and prosperity should be understood only as a precondition for being admitted into 
United Europe. How these preconditions could be met  - with a pressure from outside 
and more or less indifferent societies, or with highly motivated ones? The answer is 
clear, but undoubtedly the only valuable motivation in the region now, are the incen-
tives and chances to become part of United Europe. Probably the best way to achieve all 
the aims of the Stability Pact, is the region integration into the European structures as 
soon as possible. However the implications from such a kind of forced and premature 
integration would be unbearable for both  - the EU and the region. Both are unprepared 
for such a step and will remain so for years ahead. But some well-designed steps like 
the so-called Stabilisation and Association Agreements between the EU and the coun-
tries from the Western Balkans may open new and promising opportunities. 
4. The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe (SEE) - 
the first results 
Almost two years after the inauguration of the Stability Pact there is ample evidence 
that SEE is no longer the Old World’s completely forgotten periphery. The region 
shows a clear inclination to move towards Europe step by step, especially in response to 
the Stability Pact for SEE. The pact may not yet provide the desired level of stability 
and prosperity for the region, but it has already become a cornerstone for the progres-
sive Europeanization of the Balkans and is almost a success story. The significance of 
what has already been achieved must always be viewed against the legacy of the past in 
order to understand the magnitude of what is being started.
14 
The victory of the democratic opposition in the presidential elections in FRY and later 
in the parliamentary elections in Serbia has initiated a new phase not only in the democ-
ratisation process in Yugoslavia, but also in the further implementation of the Stability 
 
13  For the critical evaluation of the European perspective for the Balkans, see Wolf-
gang Bruckmann: Der Balkan darf nicht in die EU, in: Die Welt, 28.7.1999. 
14  For more information about the Stability Pact structure and goals, see Rafael Bier-
mann: The Stability Pact for SEE  - potential, problems and perspectives.  ZEI 
Discussion Paper C 56, 1999. South Eastern Europe 
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Pact. The disappearance of the "black hole"  - FRY with Milosevic as head of state, 
which endangered so often the future of the Pact, opened new perspectives for the 
whole of SEE. The downfall of Milosevic was enabled not only by the internal devel-
opments in FRY. A substantial part was played also by the alternative shown to the 
Yugoslav public by the neighbouring countries with their prospects for a European f u-
ture, compared with the isolation from the international community offered by the old 
Belgrade regime. 
Since the Sarajevo summit on July 31, 1999, at which the heads of state and government 
of more than 30 countries solemnly declared their wish to join the Stability Pact for 
SEE, the region has made a solid progress in the consolidation of peace, democratisa-
tion and reconstruction. Most dramatically, the Serbs themselves have deposed Slobo-
dan Milosevic as their leader. Less spectacularly  - but of enormous long-term signifi-
cance  - the Stability Pact has established itself as the international community’s most 
comprehensive grand design for the region. At the international donors’ conference on 
March 29 and 30, 2000 in Brussels 2,4 billion Euros were promised for a series of infra-
structural projects, the so-called "quick-start package". With the adoption of the 
"Agenda for  Stability" at the second meeting of the Regional Table on June 8, 2000 in 
Thessaloniki, the organisational phase gave way to the implementation phase. But the 
real end of the first phase of the Stability Pact was nevertheless the overthrough of Mr. 
Milosevic. With the FRY joining the Pact in November 2000 the actual implementation 
of the Stability Pact strategy could start at last. 
The first phase of activity within the framework of the Stability Pact prompted mixed 
feelings throughout the region. After the Sarajevo summit, one could observe a rising 
spiral of hope, of euphoric expectations that the Gordon knot of historical legacies and 
contemporary problems could be cut at last. When efforts failed to lead to a rapid recon-
ciliation in Kosovo, or to eliminate the war-time damages, such as the blockade of D a-
nube navigation, critical voices multiplied, both in number and volume. The donors’ 
conference produced a lot of optimism, which was somehow diminished by the slow 
start of the "quick start package" projects. Another wave of optimism was generated by 
the downfall of Mr. Milosevic. 
In the same time the Balkan societies show little understanding for the necessity of link-
ing economic assistance with certain political developments aiming at a successful 
transformation of the postcommunist societies in the region. This impatience is a rather 
widespread phenomenon in the Balkans; people tend to see the causes for their prob-
lems outside of their own communities or ethnic groups, and very often they try to 
commission others, whether the Great Powers in the past, or the international commu-
nity and the Stability Pact now, to solve them. And nevertheless, despite the mixed feel-
ings, no one in the region doubts the significance of the Stability Pact. Emil Mintchev 
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The political situation in the region has indeed undergone positive changes, to some 
extent due to the mere existence of the Stability Pact. Democratisation in Serbia and in 
Croatia after the elections is making progress. Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia had 
local elections.  Inter-ethnic tensions within Kosovo remain high, but the local elections 
that gave almost two-thirds of the Kosovar votes to moderate candidates should mark 
another step towards normality. Bulgaria and Romania have started negotiations for the 
EU accession, and Greece and Turkey also started to improve the bilateral relations. In 
fact regional cooperation is making startling progress. The heads of states and govern-
ments from the SEE countries are meeting regularly within the framework of the politi-
cal cooperation process. At the meeting in Bucharest in February 2000 they agreed on a 
"Charter for Good Neighbourly Relations, Stability, Security and Cooperation in SEE". 
A year later in February 2001 in Skopje, this time with the new Yugoslav president 
Kostunica, new milestones in the cooperation process, especially in the economic field, 
were set. All these developments do not always take place under the aegis of the Stabil-
ity Pact, but the Pact has contributed decisively to the emergence of an atmosphere of 
partnership that has made intensified regional cooperation possible. 
The Stability Pact achievements include the secured financing of the so-called "quick 
start package"  - 35 major infrastructure projects such as the Skopje-Pristina motorway 
and a new Danube bridge between Romania and Bulgaria. They also inched an initiative 
corruption, a charter to improve the investment climate, a charter for independent media 
support, and the initiation of the so-called Szeged Process. The latter probably contrib-
uted among  other factors to Milosevic’s downfall by sponsoring partnerships with Ser-
bian cities and towns governed by the democratic opposition, thus delivering the mes-
sage that the international community was isolating only the Milosevic’s regime, not 
democratically-minded Serbs. 
As the Pact was a German initiative and was realised during the Germany EU presi-
dency, Berlin’s role in helping to set up a new peace order in the region is of particular 
importance. This specifically German role is performed within the framework of a 
common EU strategy towards SEE, and one can therefore assert that the EU carries a 
special responsibility for the success of the Stability Pact. 
A cornerstone of the EU strategy towards SEE are the Stabilisation and Association 
Agreements with t he countries of the Western Balkan. These agreements are not only 
the juridical basis for the future relations between the EU and the Western Balkan 
states; they also provide the step by step inclusion of these states in the EU integration 
structures and t he prospect of future EU membership. Macedonia already signed such 
an agreement on 24.11.2000 during the so-called EU-Western Balkans Summit in Z a-
greb. Croatia is in the midst of its negotiations with the EU Commission. Albania and 
possibly Bosnia-Herzegovina will follow soon. And since Bulgaria and Romania are 
already making progress in the EU accession negotiations and Slovenia is expected to South Eastern Europe 
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be among the first new EU members, one can speak of a whole series of important EU 
"outposts" in the region. The p articipants of the Zagreb summit, where the new Yugo-
slav president Kostunica was also presented, came to the conclusion that the victory of 
the democratic opposition in FRY will give new impetus to the Stability Pact for SEE. 
Stability in the region with M ilosevic in Belgrade was almost impossible. The same was 
valid for the European perspectives for the region and for solving the task to make the 
region economically "fit for Europe". That is why the victory of the democratic opposi-
tion in FRY created new c hances for the success of the Stability Pact and also for the 
quicker integration of the region into Europe. New perspectives  appeared for a more 
effective conflict prevention and for diminishing the conflict potential in the Balkans. 
The chances for consolidating Bosnia-Herzegovina are better now, as far as the new 
leadership in Belgrade demonstrates that it will not support the ultranationalistic forces 
in Pale. Even the peace prospects for Kosovo are better now, despite the tension in the 
border districts with South Serbia. The outcome of the local elections in Kosovo is an 
indication that the majority of the Kosovo Albanians is against radicalism and terrorism. 
Although a lot of past memories and present day prejudices and tensions still over-
shadow the  relations Belgrade-Pristina, and the process of healing the wounds and rec-
onciliation will take years and even decades, Kostunica and Rugova are the best possi-
ble negotiating partners for the years to come. 
The new chances for democracy prevailing in the r egion and for achieving the goals of 
the Stability Pact are nevertheless intertwined with a number of challenges. The young 
democracy in Serbia is still fragile and at least a few more years are needed to consoli-
date it. The democratic forces there have to overcome the traps of the old nomenclature 
around Milosevic, the nationalism indoctrinated for decades through the propaganda 
instruments of the old regime, the problems of the interethnic co-existence in the still 
multiethnic FRY. One of the greatest challenges is the future of the federation and the 
union with Montenegro. The political will of the Montenegrin government for inde-
pendence supported by the majority of the population after a democratic and fair refer-
endum should have to be respected whatever the mood in Belgrade is going to be. The 
international community is going to play a vital role for keeping the process of a new 
definition of the intrafederal relation, or an eventual partition within the framework of 
the democratic procedures, not allowing the emotions to prevail. Anyhow this seems 
much more possible now without Milosevic as the strongman in Belgrade. The chal-
lenge of the reconciliation in the Western Balkans gets also new dimensions with the 
changes in Belgrade. Here a bold Serbian initiative putting the war criminals on trial 
and co-operating with the war crime tribunal in Den Haag could be a breakthrough. 
The reintegration of the FRY into the international community brings new challenges 
and new chances for the economic reconstruction f or the region. Some Stability Pact 
projects should be redefined to include FRY in them. Some others designed to bypass Emil Mintchev 
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the Milosevic’s Serbia might be reconsidered. The FRY reintegration brings also some 
fears throughout the region that Belgrade may become a new favourite of the West and 
such role might lead to certain negative impacts on the other Balkan countries. These 
fears should be addressed without hesitation with strong counterarguments in order not 
to endanger the fragile structure of the regional cooperation processes. 
All the new challenges and chances might make a redefinition of the Stability Pact strat-
egy necessary. Then up to now one of the main goals of the Stability Pact, although not 
defined, was the overthrough of Milosevic, thus paving the way for the democratic 
transformation of Serbia. The presence of Mr. Milosevic was always a very good excuse 
for the lacking of enough notable successes in bringing the region closer to Europe. This 
excuse is not valid anymore and a much more precisely defined strategy concerning the 
integration into the European structures is necessary. It could be based on the principle 
of conditionality, but include also a certain time horizon for the European perspectives 
of the region. Most probably the process of negotiation and conclusion of the Stabilisa-
tion and Association Agreements with the EU should be intensified and include the 
FRY. The region needs more selfresponsibility, which could be stimulated among other 
factors also by more solidarity on the part of the EU. 
Gradually an island of stability is taking shape in traditionally unstable surroundings. It 
is changing the Balkans, step by step, into a region where European standards and prin-
ciples of democracy are increasingly taking hold. To make this process  irreversible, the 
EU should step up its engagement in SEE. In the region high hopes are being placed on 
the forthcoming Stabilisation and Association Agreements and on financial aid under 
the OBNOVA and PHARE programs, as well as on series of preferential  trade agree-
ments providing for asymmetrical liberalisation of trade between the EU and the states 
in SEE. All these expected steps represent an urgent necessity for the region’s crisis-
plagued economies. One welcomed development would be more active participation by 
the EU and its institutions in the mobilisation and coordination of the international 
community’s aid to SEE, including smoother cooperation between the Commission and 
the Special Co-ordinator for the Stability Pact. The EU could play a leading  role in for-
mulating a strategy for the Stability Pact future activities. But such a strategy, with 
short-, middle-, and long-term goals and also a master plan for the infrastructure of the 
entire region has yet to emerge. Another important question is not  only that of project 
financing but of project management, especially having in mind the region’s rigid b u-
reaucratic structures and corrupt administrations. 
The EU should use the Stability Pact more effectively as an instrument of its own pol-
icy, to demonstrate the attractiveness of the European perspective to the people of the 
region. This prospect, with its chances for integration and transformation of the region 
into an integral part of the European family, is the strongest counter-argument to wide-
spread  concept of the nation-state in its 19th century variant that unfortunately has many South Eastern Europe 
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adherents in the Balkans. The EU must demonstrate sufficient vision and flexibility in 
working out a timetable for bringing SEE into the structures of an United Europe. Post-
poning the process indefinitely could only ruin this attractive prospect. 
By all indications, the international presence in SEE will last for decades to come. The 
military presence of KFOR troops in Kosovo and SFOR troops in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
remains indispensable for the consolidation of the still fragile peace. The same is valid 
for the international community’s presence in form of the International High Represen-
tative for Bosnia-Herzegovina and UNMIK in Kosovo. The international community’s 
task cannot be regarded as finished until the region’s postcommunist societies have be-
come open societies that accept the rule of law, provide European-style social welfare, 
and thus show their ability to preserve and nurture multiethnicity. Until then the interna-
tional community will need to use the Stability Pact as an instrument for preventing 
conflict, promoting democracy, and bolstering economic development in SEE. This is 
why the current phase of the Stability Pact activity, is so important. The Pact must now 
substantially improve its capacity to take decisions and to act. The EU should play a 
leading role in working out a successful strategy and coordinating it with the G -8 coun-
tries and the NATO. The formulation of priorities should not, as is now the case, lead to 
a preference for the infrastructure economic projects, which currently consume nearly 
80% of all approved funding. No doubt new motorways and bridges are important for 
the region’s future. Even more important however are the new, European-minded men 
and women who will someday take this future into their own hands. The projects and 
initiatives of the Stability Pact’s first working table-on democratisation and human 
rights therefore deserve special attention, with the emphasis on higher education and 
professional training of the future intellectual and professional elites. This is the only 
way to encourage personal responsibility in society, an essential condition for the suc-
cess of any integrative strategy for the region. Unfortunately, passive attitudes still 
dominate in the region. Counteracting them requires the active and equal participation 
of the countries and societies in SEE in the design and implementation of all initiatives 
by the international community in the region. Just as important is the creation of a con-
sciousness in which every individual citizen accepts the problems and the challenges of 
the society and the country as his own. The Stability Pact may encourage such responsi-
bility among societies and individuals in the region thus enabling the truly grand 
achievement - making SEE an integral part of the European family. 
5. The new dangers and the possible answers 
The first two years after the Kosovo war were unfortunately not only a success story in 
bringing the region closer to Europe. A l ot of unfulfilled expectations that led to many 
disillusionments and disappointments throughout the region and a lot of inadequate r e-
action on the part of the local governments and the international community created a Emil Mintchev 
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climate favourable to some crisis elements to appear again showing that every omission 
in dealing persistently with the regional crisis potential could have grave consequences. 
The approach of the KFOR troops – in not a very persistent way - in disarming the UCK 
formations and dismantling its military structures made possible the accumulation of 
huge weapons depots in the hands of the most radical UCK commanders. The quite of-
ten absence of persecution in case of committed acts of violence against the Serb, or 
Roma minority nurtured the wrong belief that NATO and KFOR are UCK or Albanian 
allies. The passive  and very reluctant mode of conduct of the KFOR troops, their insuf-
ficient numbers in the border areas and the power vacuum in the buffer zone around the 
Kosovo borders, which remained almost without any KFOR control, allowed a free 
movement of weapons and military formations into South Serbia and Northern Mace-
donia. In such a way, UCK created a huge space for military and clandestine (including 
smuggling) operations covering Kosovo, the areas in South Serbia and Northern and 
Western Macedonia inhabited by Albanians and the northern part of Albania proper 
inhabited by Albanian Gegs. In a rural clan society with different parallel structures the 
strongest influence always gets the organisation w ith a clear hierarchical military struc-
ture and not any loose political party. And this was undoubtedly the UCK and its n u-
merous spin-offs. Within the above mentioned operational space the different UCK 
formations had a free hand to decide what kind of a strategy to undertake for achieving 
their goals. Weapons were in abundance, recruits also - due to the huge unemployment 
rate among the young Albanians and the financial support could be secured through 
illegal or semilegal deals in the region including the smuggling of goods and people, 
drug traffic and through the operations of the Albanian Mafia abroad. The short term 
goals were more or less to retain the influence over the Albanian population and to con-
tinue to play a key role in every future negotiation about the status of Kosovo and the 
neighbouring areas inhabited with Albanians. The middle- and long-term goals were not 
only the creation of an independent Kosovo, but a design of a much greater scale-Great 
Kosovo including the Presevo valley with the towns of Presevo, Bujanovac and Med-
vedja in South Serbia and Northern and Western Macedonia with the city of Tetovo as 
economic and cultural center of the Albanians living in Macedonia. Not Greater Alba-
nia, but Greater Kosovo was the ultimate goal because of the pivotal role played by the 
Kosovars for the realisation of the Albanian national idea. This situation was misunder-
stood by the international community, which expected the nationalistic signals to come 
from Tirana and not from Pristina or Prizren, where actually the Albanian revival started 
more then a century ago. 
The lack of a clear future status for Kosovo could only strengthen the idea that through 
insurgents’ pressure and destabilisation in the areas around Kosovo the international 
community could  be forced to take decisions favourable to the Albanian cause. The i n-
struments for this kind of pressure were two UCK inspired structures the UCPBM (Lib-South Eastern Europe 
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eration Army for Presevo, Bujanovac and Medvedja) in the Presevo valley in South 
Serbia and UCK(National  Liberation Army), which intentionally has the same abbrevia-
tion as the Kosovo Liberation Army. The insurgents’ actions started on a large scale 
after the local elections in Kosovo, where the moderates around Ibrachim Rugova 
achieved a clear victory, indicating that the majority of the Kosovo Albanians is weary 
from the interethnic hatred and violence and prefer normality. The radicals within the 
UCK have decided obviously to regain their influence by radicalising the society anew 
through spectacular actions pretending to defend the rights of the Albanians in South 
Serbia and Macedonia. The actions were first localised in the Presevo valley alone and 
moved to Macedonia only after the agreement between NATO and the Yugoslav gov-
ernment, allowing the entry of the Serbian army into the buffer zone, was signed. On a 
large scale the actions in Macedonia started after the governments in Skopje and Bel-
grade signed the agreement for the delimitation of the state border between FRY and 
Macedonia, of which almost 80% make the border between Kosovo and Macedonia. All 
these developments should have to be understood that the Albanian radicals are not 
ready to tolerate any move of the international community in direction closer to Bel-
grade and to the FRY position on the future status of Kosovo. The targets of the policy 
of radicalisation are twofold. First, the Kosovo Albanian society with the aim to regain 
the dominant role UCK already had in the aftermath of the war in order to get a better 
position on the eve of the parliamentary elections in Kosovo. Second, the international 
community EU and NATO by giving the signal that any policy other then leading to the 
Kosovo independence and bringing somehow FRY back on the stage could provoke a 
proliferation of the insurgency involving areas outside Kosovo. 
In Bosnia-Herzegovina in the sixth year after the Dayton peace accord was marked with 
a very dangerous discord within the Muslim-Croatian Federation, which may lead to a 
grave consequences for the future of the Bosnian state. The  firm wish of the Bosnian 
Croats to leave the Federation structures and of their leader Mr. Jelavic to resign from 
his post to the Presidency throws the extreme fragile state into a severe political crisis, 
which endangers its mere existence. 
The continuing dispute between Serbia and Montenegro on their eventual separation 
adds to the somehow gloomy picture of the region in the third year after the Kosovo 
war. The independence of Montenegro would not surprise anybody and for sure would 
not provoke any violence or retaliatory measures from Belgrade. The process of nation-
and nationstate building on the territory of ex-Yugoslavia should not be reversed just for 
Montenegro, after all the other former Yugoslav republics realised their national ideas. 
What annoys  the international community are the repercussions that will follow such an 
act. The Montenegrin independence means the official death of the Yugoslav Federation 
and will bring for sure a political crisis in Serbia, where the Federal institutions, includ-
ing the Federal president Kostunica will become obsolete overnight. Serbia will became Emil Mintchev 
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a land-locked country and the federal navy might remain docked for indefinite time in 
the Kotor bay. Montenegro might also go through some convulsions due to the polarisa-
tion within the Montenegrin society on the issue of independence. At the end the two 
parties may define a new federation or confederation where Podgorica and Belgrade 
shall enjoy equal status. In the meantime the disappearance of the FRY may put the f u-
ture o f Kosovo and probably of Voivodina in a completely different light, and this is 
what annoys the international community. 
What are the answers to the new dangers that started to appear in 2001? If we try to ana-
lyse their origin, we should discover surprisingly the same reason that was behind every 
failure of the international community dealing with the Balkans up to now  - the lack of 
a well-defined common long-term strategy towards the whole region. The war in Kos-
ovo made such a strategy imminent. The Stability Pact is a result of such an approach. 
But this approach remained predominantly within the EU and concerned mainly the 
issues of reconstruction and democratisation. NATO took the responsibility for the s e-
curity dimension and here the regional approach s omehow was subordinated to com-
mand structures like SFOR and KFOR, territorially restricted with very little coordina-
tion with all the other activities outside their activity areas
15. Almost nothing was done 
to formulate a new peace order for the region. Hot issues like the future status of Kos-
ovo were postponed for better times. Wrong signals were given like the eventual with-
drawal of American troops from Bosnia and Kosovo. False impressions were created 
among some ethnic groups that they may use the West and NATO against their adver-
saries for the fulfilment of their nationalistic dreams. The discrepancy between the civic 
and the military elements of the international community’s strategy were not so fatal as 
far as the power in Belgrade was in the hands of M r. Milosevic. His presence legiti-
mized the isolation of FRY and the hopes for independent Kosovo and independent 
Montenegro. But now with the reintegration of Belgrade in the international community 
there are no evil regimes left. Every issue about the future status of disputed areas like 
Kosovo should have to be negotiated in a fair and democratic way and not dictated or 
imposed from above. This is a completely new situation in which there is no more clear 
division between allies and enemies and some radicals are not willing to accept this new 
reality. Here the international community, the UN, the NATO and the EU should act 
with resolute determination in reinstituting law and order, peace and stability in the r e-
gion. This should be achieved in close cooperation with the countries from the region 
and the local authorities, but only with the legitimate ones and not the self-imposed or 
self-proclaimed. All the ethnicities should have to be represented, but with their moder-
ates and not with their radicals. A UN sponsored conference should try to determine the 
future of Kosovo and provide a solid guarantee for a peaceful ethnic coexistence every-
 
15  See also Bodo Hombach: Violence in the Balkans Demands Swifter Response by 
NATO. in: International Herald Tribune, 13. 3. 2001. South Eastern Europe 
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where in the region. A redefined strategy for the new peace order, for stability and for 
integration in the United Europe, bringing together the civic and the military compo-
nents, i. e. the Stability Pact with the international military presence, has to be designed 
by all the countries in the region under the aegis of the EU and NATO with a clear time-
table for the European p erspective. The implementation of this strategy has to be r e-
viewed every year on an suitable international forum. This is the only framework for a 
peaceful, stable and prosperous region able to undergo a successful transformation into 
an integral part of United Europe. 
6. The challenges of the transformation 
To transform the Balkans into a region fit for EU integration would be a task unparal-
leled in history. Every comparison with the Marshall plan for Western Europe could 
only lead to simplification and hardly corresponds to reality. 
The Marshall plan aimed at healing the war wounds, combining the post war recon-
struction with the society cure, where it was poisoned with the Nazi and fascist ideas, 
like in Germany or in Italy. But the societies, they are part of the Western civilisations, 
with developed market economies and thus able to get rid of their social retardation 
quite successfully. On the Balkans due to the centuries of old isolation from the main-
stream of the European civilisation, especially in some parts of the Western Balkans, 
due to the heritage of some of the most brutal communist regimes in the world and the 
period of anarchy after the collapse of the communist state structures, and last but not 
least due to the several bloody wars, that followed the collapse of ex-Yugoslavia, the 
West is facing a completely different situation. A region, or at least a part of it , has to 
be catapulted into the 21st century after having remained predominantly in an everlast-
ing 19th century. And the appropriate terminology for some of the tasks laying ahead is 
not aid but therapy. Therapy for the evils of nationalism, ethnic and religious intoler-
ance and hatred, therapy for the evils of the social retardation, of the mentality of Bal-
kan provincialism, therapy for the poverty and the precapitalistic economic structures. 
But all this means that the Stability Pact, in order to succeed, has to be not predomi-
nantly a stabilisation strategy, but a definitive integration strategy, for bringing the 
whole region step by step into the mainstream of the European civilisation, i. e. into the 
United Europe. Anything short of a full integration strategy is doomed to fail, with cata-
strophic consequences not only for the region, but also for the whole of Europe. 
The period of time after the war in Kosovo has indicated already how difficult getting 
closer to all indicated aims is going to be. The typical change of roles between the vic-
tim and oppressor seems to repeat itself again with the dreadful logic, everybody e x-
pected to be eliminated forever with this final war - as many thought in the Balkans. But 
even the impressive KFOR presence could not succeed to break for now this vicious Emil Mintchev 
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circle, endangering the very essence of the concept for establishing a multiethnic, peace-
ful and democratic Kosovo. Under the present circumstances such a Kosovo where A l-
banians, Serbs, Roma and all other ethnic groups were supposed to live in harmony and 
cooperation under the UN rule, setting an example for the whole of South Eastern 
Europe, seems to b e almost as far from realisation, as in Kosovo under Serbian rule. 
This situation brings some experts to suggest, that probably an ethnic separation until 
the emotions cool, is preferable, than the actual development, by which a monoethnic 
Kosovo will inevitably come into existence. A temporary ethnic partition may lead to a 
de facto partition of the province, but will preserve its multiethnic character, leaving 
open the chance, that at a later moment after enough time for the healing of the war 
wounds has  passed, an attempt for an ethnic reconciliation could be made again, this 
time probably with more success, is the line of thinking of these experts. 
Such an approach will be a pragmatic one, resembling very much the present Bosnian 
situation and having in  mind, that ethnic hatred just after an interethnic war is so domi-
nant, that only a temporary separation of the warring parties could prevent revenge and 
thus further bloodsheds. But pragmatism is hardly the only answer to the initial setbacks 
seeming to be inevitable in this unique post-war peace process. Because there is a pos-
sibility, that it could lead to another setback connected with the beneficiaries from the 
partition of the Kosovo  - the radicals within both ethnic groups. The radical fraction in 
the UCK retains its influence despite the fact that the UCK was transformed in the so-
called Kosovo Defence Corps (KDC). Its influence is substantial also within UCK-
established parallel power structures all over Kosovo. Thus the UNMIK administration  
has hardly any other choices, but to cooperate or to relay  on these structures, even after 
the local elections where the moderate Albanian politicians were victorious, remained 
nevertheless with a limited power leverage. In the foreseeable future the UCK structures 
may transform themselves into a predominantly political party structure. However, the 
temptations of the power may lead quite well into their transformation into a parallel 
administration with its own legal and police functions. If the UN administration tries to 
curtail these functions with the help of the KFOR, then the UCK or its successor may go 
into semilegality, preserving its authority over the fate of its fellow citizens, beyond any 
external control. Such a development would inevitably strengthen the radical fraction. 
Its power and influence leverage would be even greater, if the ethnic separation has al-
ready occurred. In such a case the UNMIK and KFOR will have the extremely difficult 
task to tame a much more radicalised UCK. With this possibility as an option, than the 
chances for UCK to transform itself into a normal political organisation, trying to 
achieve its political goals through political means, are may-be greater under the situa-
tion of Kosovo ethnically unpartitioned. Otherwise the UCK or KDC could mutate into 
a very dangerous enemy, who is going to try to get rid of a foreign impostor blocking 
the way towards the Kosovo independence. South Eastern Europe 
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7. A difficult peace 
The developments since the end of the war in Kosovo indicate, that the international 
community has failed so far to achieve the main goal for going into war at all  - the 
emergence of a peaceful, democratic and multiethnic Kosovo and a peaceful and stable 
region. But was it realistic to expect in a matter of a few years ethnic tolerance to pre-
vail there, where for the last decade nothing besides the ethnic conflict has dominated 
the relations between Serbs and Albanians? Hardly any expert from the region has ex-
pected a miracle to occur. For the region a matter of concern is not the continuation for 
some time of the interethnic violence - it was more or less expected, but the level of the 
Western engagement. Many local experts and politicians fear, that a disappointed West 
may abandon the great design of the Stability Pact and minimise its efforts only to pre-
serve a kind of truce in the province. Disappointment usually comes from too high ex-
pectations. And high expectations are more or less a product of a false evaluation and 
unfounded optimism based on an inadequate expertise about the region. 
Kosovo may become such a case. Here the task is to avoid the mistakes made in Bosnia, 
to avoid the ethnic separation at any price and to press for multiethnic Kosovo. But 
there are few parallels and many more differences between Bosnia and Kosovo. One 
should not forget, that Bosnia-Herzegovina(BiH) was already a multiethnic entity, espe-
cially the big cities like Sarajevo. In Bosnia-Herzegovina the language barrier did not 
exist at all. Serbo-Croat was the common language and the confessional differences 
seemed almost suppressed in the communist society of pre-1991 Yugoslavia. The war 
showed how fragile that sort of a multiethnic society is. Nothing similar ever existed in 
Kosovo. There were two parallel monoethnic societies, with different languages, con-
fessions and cultures and almost without any contact besides the unavoidable due to the 
coexistence in a common administrative unit. One ethnic group  - the Serbs were domi-
nant, although only a minority in terms of a population. The other - the Kosovo Albani-
ans were driven at the periphery of the social life, encapsulated themselves, setting up 
even their own education system. Downgraded to the role of a second rate population, 
the Kosovo Albanians step by step alienated themselves from the state, whose citizens 
they were. 
The war and the ethnic cleansing criss-crossed finally any hope for a common future of 
Serbs and Albanians within the FRY. To establish a multiethnic society based on d e-
mocratic principles in Kosovo after the war will be an enormous task, for which not 
only a strong commitment on part of the international community will be needed, but 
also a great deal of responsibility, repentance and forgiveness on the part of both ethnic 
groups. Having in mind the failure up to now to move decisively forward on the same 
task in Bosnia, where compared to Kosovo, as it seemed, much more factors in favour 
were present, we have to look closer at the reasons for it. The de facto partition of BiH Emil Mintchev 
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in the Muslim-Croat federation and in Republika Srpska actually undermined the future 
of the united and multiethnic BiH. In the partitioned BiH, it was easier for SFOR to se-
cure the peace, but the political elites in the respective parts of the country, become re-
luctant to share power and financial assistance otherwise but on ethnical bases. The 
creation of two separate administrations additionally deepened the ethnic partition, add-
ing new obstacles for its elimination. 
Obviously the same might happen with Kosovo. Here the stake is even greater, because 
the war was fought f or a democratic and multiethnic alternative to the Serbian domi-
nated province. A failure would be hardly justified, because it would be the equivalent 
of a defeat. That is why any partition on ethnic bases, any creation of ethnic enclaves, 
how seductive it is going to appear for easing the interethnic tensions, would diminish 
substantially the chances for achieving the goal, for which the operation "Allied Force" 
started. 
But is the present situation so desperate, that an ethnic separation in the form of estab-
lishing militarily protected enclaves for the local Serbs, looks unavoidable? In the 
power vacuum after the pull-out of the Serbian forces and the return of the Albanian 
refugees, some increase of the violence based on revenge seemed unavoidable. The m a-
jority of the Serbs living in Kosovo fled fearing the wrath of their Albanian neighbours, 
because they knew quite well, what was done to them after 1989 and especially after the 
beginning of the "Allied Force" operation. We should also take into account the inten-
tion on the part of the radicals within the KLA to create a more or less Serb-free Kos-
ovo. The engagements of the international community in Kosovo, the effective role of 
the UN administration, the KFOR military presence and the post-war reconstruction 
will for sure create a totally new atmosphere in which  the interethnic cooperation 
should become a necessity for the sake of the common future of all ethnic groups and 
may-be a norm of interethnic behaviour. In such a case the fears of the ethnic Serbs 
would be eliminated and there would be no obstacles for them to return back to their 
homes in Kosovo. The process of ethnic reconciliation may even become easier for the 
smaller numbers of other ethnic groups. Thus Kosovo, where the prerequisites for the 
creation of a multiethnic society were on a lesser scale then in BiH, might move quicker 
towards the proclaimed goal and even become an example for BiH. 
Again lessons should be learnt from the situation in Bosnia and may be the passage of 
the legislative  and executive powers to the local administration, should be linked to the 
success in the interethnic understanding. The transfer of some functions to the local po-
litical elites is desirable, but one should not forget, that this transfer, without outside 
control, increases the prospects for corruption and misuse of international funds, as the 
case of BiH has shown. Probably all vital elements of the local governance should r e-
main in the hands of UNMIK as long as a normal environment free of excessive corrup-
tion is created. Priority in the initial stages should be given to the healing of the war South Eastern Europe 
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wounds, bringing those, who committed war crimes before the International War 
Crimes Tribunal and rehabilitation of all war victims. Bringing the Kosovo Albanians 
and  the Kosovo Serbs together in the different tasks concerning the return of the prov-
ince to normality, making them to feel, that sharing responsibilities for the future of 
Kosovo is better and reasonable, than fighting each other forever, letting them to under-
stand, that this possible future is the only alternative to the present day mess, and last 
but not least to support and engage the moderates and try to isolate and marginalize the 
radicals and the extremists would be a major contribution to the emergence of a democ-
ratic, multiethnic Kosovo. 
The same is valid also for Macedonia. Being the success story in the transition from a 
Yugoslav republic to an independent state, Macedonia was given as an example for a 
multiethnic society, offering participation in p ower on the local and the government 
level to its large Albanian minority (about 30% of the population). The crisis from 
spring 2001 in which Albanian insurgents attacked the second largest Macedonian city 
Tetovo came as a surprise for many who took the statistical data for a sufficient proof 
for a well functioning multiethnic state and interpreted the UCK actions as an outside 
attempt to destabilise the country. For sure in Macedonia the interethnic coexistence 
was advanced to a level unprecedented else in the Western Balkans. But even there in a 
country with five ministers from Albanian origin, the Albanians considered themselves 
as discriminated and raised unanimously the demand for constitutional changes allow-
ing them to become the second state-constituting nation. With a huge unemployment 
rate and few chances for a state servant or a military career, the young Albanians in Ma-
cedonia became an easy target for the radical slogans of the UCK. The traditional politi-
cal parties of the Albanian minority were a lready considered as corrupt and they lost 
almost every influence especially among the young. So the radicalisation was not unex-
pected and to reverse it, the whole Macedonian society needs a sober review of its re-
cord of minority integration and interethnic tolerance, a redefinition of the framework 
for ethnic coexistence and a lot of help from the international community. 
8. Beyond the ethnic partition 
Multiethnic Kosovo is the optimistic version of the possible provincial development. 
But if the interethnic violence could not be stopped, if it increases in the case the r e-
maining Serbs start to retaliate, then it could be quite realistic not to exclude the imple-
mentation of some form of ethnic separation. The ethnic partition is always presented at 
the beginning as a temporary solution. It actually diminishes the interethnic violence 
and becomes the preferable outcome for the outside trouble-shooters. At the end the 
ground for the interethnic violence is more or less eliminated, but what about the con-
flict potential? Emil Mintchev 
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Following the patterns of the ethnic partition, we could expect to get Kosovo predomi-
nantly controlled by the Kosovo Albanians with some Serbian inhabited enclaves under 
the protection of the KFOR troops. Very few interethnic contacts are possible under  
such circumstances and a monoethnic Albanian entity would become a reality quite 
soon, aspiring to get all the necessary attributes of an independent state. An independent 
Kosovo will come into existence hardly waiting for the consent of the international 
community. With such a precedent, keeping the Republika Srpska within BiH would be 
hardly possible, keeping in mind, that Pale even now is under the jurisdiction of BiH 
only on paper. 
The fragmentation under the slogan of the temporary ethnic partition might go further, 
then how the further existence of Montenegro as part of the FRY could be argumented. 
In case of a quite possible interethnic conflict in Sandjak, or in Voivodina, again the 
interethnic partition could become the easier solution. And again, a successful develop-
ment in Kosovo  - from the Albanian point of view  - could trigger similar attempts on 
the part of the Albanians living in Macedonia. An interethnic partition could be pursued 
in Western Macedonia, where the ethnic Albanians are a majority. Even the Eastern part 
of the Balkans, less endangered by ethnic tension now, might be infected by the parti-
tion virus. Ethnic Turks in North East and South Bulgaria, ethnic Hungarians in Trans-
silvania, Romania might also prefer the ethnic partition instead of the interethnic co-
existence. The fragmentation based on ethnic lines is a known phenomenon in the r e-
gion and is called with a term loaded with a very negative meaning - i. e. balkanisation. 
Thus ethnic partition, even as a temporary measure might lead to a new spiral of bal-
kanisation, creating no ethnic peace, but a new ground for revenge and interethnic wars. 
Because hardly anybody could imagine that the nation-states in which the process of 
ethnic self-determination is going to start, would remain passive in front of a possible 
fragmentation and dismemberment. And how the international community is going to 
take the role of the arbitrator, deciding which ethnic group has the right to secede. Of 
course Kosovo is a special case with unique characteristics and an eventual develop-
ment there towards independence does not mean automatically that the same is going to 
happen all over the Balkans, where ethnic minorities exist. Nevertheless the interna-
tional community should not give up prematurely,  before every alternative at hand is 
not explored in order to avoid the creation of a quite dangerous precedent. It would be 
interesting to look, who is the most fervent advocate of the ethnic partition in Kosovo. 
This is the regime in Belgrade, which could benefit a lot from any step diminishing the 
chance for the emergence of a multiethnic Kosovo. 
It could be concluded, that the option of the ethnic separation, how safe and pragmatical 
it seems to be, is not the solution for the region, that could lead to interethnic peace and 
integrity. Very tempting with its chances for initial success by keeping the adversaries 
apart, it would  become counterproductive in the middle- and in the long-term. The South Eastern Europe 
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great dangers are connected not only with the possible trend o f a further balkanisation, 
but also with the almost impossible task to reverse the process of ethnic partition once 
started. To avoid the expected retaliation steps and a new surge of interethnic animosity, 
a substantial increase in the international military presence should become a necessity, 
so that the even more fragile peace in the region will be preserved. 
A glance at the eventual new political map drawn on ethnic lines might produce a geo-
political nightmare  - several protectorates kept from becoming  independent states, or 
joining their neighbours only by force  - Kosovo, Western Macedonia, Montenegro, R e-
publika Srpska, minority inhabited regions with ethnic tension  - Sandjak, Voivodina in 
FRY, potentially unstable regions with mixed populations  - Transsilvania in Romania, 
Northeast and South Bulgaria, Northern Greece. Such a possible development could 
initiate the end of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe and the beginning of an 
extremely turbulent phase, in which the West should be compelled to keep a substantial 
military force on the Balkans for an indefinite period of time. 
The other option  - preserving the multiethnic character of the region by encouraging the 
interethnic understanding especially there where the conflict potential is at its  highest  - 
in the Western Balkans, has inevitably experienced initial setbacks. The drive for r e-
venge fuels even more the interethnic tensions. It seems, that there will be no end of the 
vicious circle of the everlasting change of roles between victims and oppressors. That is 
why the ethnic partition seems to be the logical escape from this mess. But the lessons 
of history are teaching us, that ethnic separation has created no stability on the Balkans. 
Actually the drive to create more or less ethnic homogeneous states by expelling ethnic 
minority groups, like the expatriation of the Greek population from Asia minor in Tur-
key, or by the so-called exchange of population, like the agreement between Bulgaria 
and Greece, have contributed to a lesser interethnic t ension inside the respective coun-
tries, but unfortunately have not eliminated the hostility among them. The desired sta-
bility was never reached and the memory of the repatriation was kept alive to nourish 
revenge feelings. such feelings might bring states  quite close to war, as the Greek-
Turkish relationship has proved. Additionally ethnic partition created a fait accompli 
ready to be defended with every means by the winning side, thus making every attempt 
for a reversal an extremely risky adventure. 
If we  are going to learn something from the sad Balkan history, we should try to avoid 
the repetition of the old mistakes and stop looking for easy solutions. There are no easy 
solutions for the Balkans and one of the most difficult ones for the local peoples, b ut 
also for the international community, is the urge to preserve the multiethnic character in 
the conflict-torn parts of the region. It is almost an enormous task for places like Kos-
ovo, where the memories of the ethnic cleansing are so fresh and vivid and the wish for 
revenge so almighty. But retreating from this task the international community r etreats 
from the principles for which the war was fought. Emil Mintchev 
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The end of the vicious circle of ethnic hatred is to be achieved for sure not by separating 
the main protagonists and then guarding this separation, but by helping them to undergo 
the long and difficult process of healing the wounds, reconciliate and rediscover each 
other as participants of a common strategy to rebuild their common home. Aiming at a 
common f uture and sharing this common future is may-be the best antidote against the 
poison of the ethnic hatred. And this common future should be designed by the different 
ethnic groups in close cooperation with each other under the aegis of the international 
community institutions engaged with the post-war reconstruction. Certainly not an easy 
venture, that would meet a lot of obstacles, mobilise a lot of enemies and undergo a lot 
of setbacks. But  the only venture with a chance to create a completely new environment 
for interethnic coexistence Kosovo, able to serve as a model for the other parts of the 
conflict-torn Western Balkans. To be successful this venture should have as a final goal 
a perspective, that could be acceptable to all ethnic groups and is in a position to moti-
vate them strongly enough so they could ignore all old and present arguments in their 
interethnic disputes. 
It is clear, that an independent Albanian dominated Kosovo, or a Kosovo partitioned on 
ethnic lines, or a partition in Macedonia could not be such goal, because they will be 
considered as a victory for the one or for the other side. Victories in an interethnic con-
flict are always preludes for revenge pursued by the losing side. 
Undisputedly the only goal, the only perspective, that could be common for all ethnic 
groups on the Balkans is the integration into the EU. And the new model for interethnic 
coexistence could be presented to all ethnic groups there, as one of the preliminary 
stages, as "conditio sine qua non" for reaching this goal. In the case of Kosovo this aim 
only could bring the Kosovo Albanians and the Kosovo Serbs together, by having 
stronger attraction to both of them, than the different aspects of the interethnic hatred 
and belligerence. The European perspective is the only one having also a civilizatory 
effect, by imposing certain norms of behaviour, as a precondition for moving closer to 
the EU. In this aspect Kosovo is the greatest challenge for the international community, 
but also its greatest chance. 
The emergence of  democratic and multiethnic Kosovo will take years, even decades and 
would not be safe from failures and setbacks. No decisive breakthrough is going to hap-
pen until both ethnic communities do not discover a common goal, that might bring 
them together around the idea of a common future for them within multiethnic Kosovo. 
Such a goal and such an idea are absent now, most probably they will remain absent 
also in the next few years. But they have the chance to emerge along with the successes 
in the post-war reconstruction, in the infrastructural reshaping of the whole region, in 
the maturing of the young democracies. The feeling of belonging to a society built a c-
cording to the European standards and the improving chances to become one day an 
integral part of the United Europe might get stronger and stronger than the ethnic hatred South Eastern Europe 
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stemming from the past. And the rational calculation, that only as a democratic and 
multiethnic society, rather than as a monoethnic second Albanian state, or an ethically 
partitioned protectorate, the Kosovo inhabitants could one day become EU citizens, 
could turn into a major boost behind the idea of Kosovo united, multiethnic and democ-
ratic. 
9. Selfresponsibility is the key 
The international military presence in the Western Balkans, i.  e. in BiH, Kosovo, Alba-
nia and Macedonia, the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe with its perspectives for 
economic reconstruction and European integration, the stronger and permanent e n-
gagement of the international community create a totally new, favourable environment 
for a peaceful and prosperous future development. However it would be hardly unrealis-
tic to expect, that the Western presence and engagements could lead to some kind of a 
social engineering, that might create miracles and transform in a  matter of several years 
the Balkans into a multiethnic paradise. The Western presence would most probably 
succeed to divert the most dangerous trends in the multiethnic relations, would help 
decisively in the economic reconstruction, support democracy to  catch hold in the r e-
gion. But it could not stop or drastically alter the nation- and nationstate building proc-
ess in the Western Balkans already gaining strength. What could be done, is to make it 
much more civilised and less painful for the different ethnic groups. To expect that the 
West could once more impose any solution on the Balkans, without the consent of the 
local peoples, by using some modern version of the stick and carrot policy, would be a 
grave miscalculation with no less grave consequences. W hat the international commu-
nity might do, is to try to bring this process under control, to try to block the already 
traditional excesses of the region and to propose some alternatives, impossible and u n-
thinkable under the previous circumstances. The final decision will be taken however by 
the citizens themselves, adhering this time, hopefully, to the principles of the liberal 
democracy. It would be a long time until liberal democracy could emerge in this region, 
but only at such a stage free citizens might decide freely and with responsibility on their 
own future. And only the awakening of the selfresponsibility together with the maturity 
of the young democracies could turn the local societies into equal partners of the inter-
national community. 
So it should not be a surprise, if the Kosovo Albanians refuse to be citizens of the FRY 
anymore, be it the FRY under the present regime, or in the post-Milosevic stage, being 
already alienated from this state in the most brutal way. The world should respect their 
preference, if it is expressed according to the democratic rules and provides full guaran-
tees for all the other ethnic groups living in Kosovo. And vice versa, countries, which 
provide all rights and liberties for their citizens, including the ethnic minorities, should 
be encouraged in their endeavour and protected against any secession threats, coming Emil Mintchev 
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from ethnic parties, clans, or organisations operating in the grey zone between legality 
and crime. 
This should be the case with Macedonia, where the ethnic balance between the Christian 
and the Muslim population is already subject for concern for the Macedonian Slavs, but 
the model of interethnic co-existence provides for the full participation and integration 
of all ethnic groups, including the Albanians, in the country’s political and economic 
life. 
The same would be valid also for BiH, if the establishment of the multiethnic and h o-
mogeneous state is going to succeed and the majority of the local population belonging 
to the three different ethnic groups favours such trends, with the exception of some ultra 
radicals. Because further fragmentation means further balkanisation, the appearance of 
smaller and smaller entities, which could hardly survive economically and politically, 
but are in a position to add additional conflict potential in the already turbulent region. 
The post-war months on the Balkans have once more demonstrated how difficult it is to 
break the vicious circle of the legacy of the past and to divert the huge inertia of centu-
ries of retarded development and of isolation from the mainstream of the European civi-
lisation. But for the first time in the long and tragic Balkan history the strategy for 
bringing peace and stability, for reaching prosperity and interethnic understanding, for 
establishing civil societies and turning the region into an integral part of United Europe 
is at hand. And the steering mechanism for this strategy  - the Stability Pact for South 
Eastern Europe is also at hand. The final success of this unparalleled endeavour depend 
on many factors. But two of them would play the key role. The resolution of the interna-
tional community to go on with the implementation of the Stability Pact, despite all the 
hardships and traps and the responsibility on the part of the regional societies by taking 
the integrative strategy of the Stability Pact as their own priority. Only acting hand in 
hand the international community and the new regional democracies are in a position to 
secure the new, bright future for the region – its European future. 
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